A Nation in Negotiation

A Nation in Negotiation

INDIA, UNFILTERED

WHO GETS TO SET THE TERMS?

A student’s future can be shaped by decisions made long before they enter a classroom. A worker’s security can depend on rules written by a platform they barely have the power to question. A community’s relationship with its land can be transformed by a project that is still at the survey stage. And a person’s ability to speak online can depend on whether a platform can distinguish a genuine government notice from an impersonation.

01 | CASTE EQUITY: CAN A RULE PROTECT STUDENTS WITHOUT LEAVING OTHERS UNCERTAIN?

On 6 November, the Union government told the Supreme Court of India that it was considering a committee to reconsider the University Grants Commission’s 2026 equity regulations.

The regulations, notified on 13 January, were designed to strengthen institutional mechanisms against discrimination in higher education. They required universities and colleges to establish equal-opportunity centres, appoint nodal officers and create complaint-redressal mechanisms covering discrimination based on caste, gender, disability and economic background.

However, the regulations were stayed by the Supreme Court on 29 January. The Court directed that the earlier 2012 regulations would remain in force until further orders.

One of the central disputes concerns Regulation 3(1)(c), which specifically defines caste-based discrimination against members of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.

Petitioners challenging the regulations argue that this definition does not explicitly extend the same specific protection to general-category students and faculty who may also experience caste-based discrimination. The regulations do, however, contain a broader definition of discrimination that covers unfair treatment on caste grounds against any stakeholder.

The Supreme Court has also raised questions about the clarity of the definitions, protection for extremely backward sub-groups within communities, the possibility of segregation in academic arrangements, and the omission of ragging as a separately identified form of discrimination.

The regulations did not emerge in a vacuum. They followed a long-running demand for stronger institutional safeguards against caste discrimination in higher education. The 2019 petition that led to this process was filed by the mothers of Rohith Vemula and Payal Tadvi, who had sought stronger mechanisms after alleged caste-based harassment.

Supporters argue that universities need more than general assurances of equality: they need accessible complaint systems, institutional accountability and representation for communities that have historically faced discrimination.

Critics, meanwhile, argue that safeguards must be clearly defined, procedurally fair and capable of addressing complaints from every student. These concerns should be assessed against the actual wording of the regulations, not simply slogans supporting or opposing them.

The Kerala High Court set aside an interim order that had allowed 16 suspended students of Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit to appear for semester examinations.

The students, belonging to the Students’ Federation of India, had been suspended following an August protest and a street play that allegedly insulted the university’s Vice-Chancellor. Their agitation also involved demands for better infrastructure and academic facilities.

A single-judge bench had allowed them to pay their fees and sit the examinations, subject to the final outcome of their case. The university appealed, arguing that the students did not meet mandatory attendance and internal-assessment requirements.

The division bench found that the students had not produced sufficient material to establish their eligibility. It also invoked earlier High Court observations that dharnas, hunger strikes and Satyagraha had no place in educational institutions.

There are two distinct issues here.

  • The university’s position: Academic regulations, including attendance and examination eligibility, must be followed. A protest cannot automatically exempt students from those requirements.
  • The students’ position: Their original demands concerned institutional infrastructure and academic facilities, and they are challenging the consequences of their suspension.

The legal outcome in this particular examination dispute rested on the lack of evidence that the students met the examination requirements. That is not quite the same as a ruling that every peaceful student protest is unlawful.

Still, the Court’s broader language raises a difficult question: how much room should universities leave for political expression and collective protest before disciplinary action begins to affect students’ education?

On 3 November, the Supreme Court made observations during hearings on petitions arising from police action during the July protests led by the Cockroach Janata Party.

The Court said that no individual or organisation could claim an indefinite right to occupy a designated protest site. It also acknowledged that the right to peaceful protest must be balanced against the rights of traders, daily-wage workers, transport operators and other people whose livelihoods can be disrupted by prolonged demonstrations.

Traders had complained of business losses and disruption. The Centre and Delhi Police argued that permission for the July demonstration had been granted for one day, but the protest continued for 17 days and later involved an unauthorised march towards Parliament.

At the same time, the petitions before the Court raised allegations of mass detentions, police excesses, internet restrictions and the closure of metro stations. These claims form part of the wider dispute and should not be treated as settled findings merely because they were raised in court.

The Court described the issue as one of competing rights,not a choice in which one group must automatically surrender its claims.

At the Satyajit Ray Film and Television Institute, student unrest that began in September continued into its sixth week.

On 5 November, two contractual faculty members were suspended, disciplinary action was initiated against professors, and six resource persons were discontinued. Academic activities were suspended until 11 December, while hostels and the mess were closed.

The student union described the actions as retaliation against faculty members who had supported students. It demanded the reinstatement of removed faculty and resource persons.

The institute’s registrar rejected the union’s account of the faculty decisions, saying contractual appointments were governed by institutional rules. He said the resource persons would resume their assignments when classes restarted.

Vice-Chancellor Santosh Ajmera said students had boycotted academic activities and that repeated efforts to restore normal teaching had failed. He also argued that prolonged course delays were harming students’ futures. Students, meanwhile, questioned the closure of academic and residential facilities and the treatment of people supporting their movement.

This is not simply a dispute over whether students should be allowed to protest. It also concerns the consequences of a prolonged shutdown for students who need to complete their degrees, faculty members whose work is suspended, and an institution responsible for maintaining academic standards.

On 6 November, social media company X told the Delhi High Court that purported police orders demanding the removal of two prominent digital-rights organisations’ accounts were fake.

The orders had been submitted through X’s online reporting system in the name of a senior Delhi Police officer. They sought the removal of accounts belonging to the Internet Freedom Foundation and the Software Freedom Law Centre, India, alleging that the organisations had defamed the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

X’s lawyer told the Court that the company had conducted an internal investigation and concluded that someone had impersonated the police officer. Delhi Police had not immediately responded to Reuters’ request for comment.

There is an important distinction here: the reporting establishes that X told the Court the notices were fake. It does not establish that Delhi Police issued them.

However, the incident raises questions about the systems through which content-removal requests are submitted and authenticated. Reuters reported that X had forwarded the notices to the affected organisations before establishing their authenticity.

When platforms can receive requests that invoke government authority, what verification should happen before an account is threatened with removal? And who is accountable when an unverified notice reaches the people it targets?

A related question emerged from the continuing legal proceedings over the violence at Lovely Professional University in Phagwara, Punjab.

In September, a social media message alleged that a female student had been sexually assaulted on campus. The allegation spread rapidly and was followed by violent unrest, damage to university property and a blockade of National Highway 44.

The university denied the allegation. A police Special Investigation Team later said it had examined footage from 14 CCTV cameras and collected responses from around 800 female students and other campus personnel without finding evidence to substantiate the alleged assault. On 30 October, police filed a cancellation report in the court handling the allegation. That report is not the same as a final judicial finding: the case formally closes only if the court accepts it.

Importantly, the cancellation report concerned the alleged assault, not the separate FIRs relating to the campus violence and property damage.

On 5 November, the Punjab and Haryana High Court directed the Punjab government to send the Centre a report within 72 hours after police added Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, concerning cyberterrorism, to the case. The Centre was asked to decide whether the National Investigation Agency should take over the investigation.

The episode leaves several separate matters to investigate:

  • How did the original allegation spread, and who created or circulated it?
  • What institutional grievances did students have before the unrest?
  • Who was responsible for the violence and property damage?
  • Were the police investigations and university responses sufficiently independent and transparent?

An unverified online allegation should not be treated as established fact. Equally, finding no evidence for one allegation does not automatically resolve every other grievance surrounding a campus.

On 6 November, IT Minister Ashwini Vaishnaw said social media companies must take responsibility for child safety, women’s safety and algorithmic transparency, and provide effective mechanisms for users to raise grievances.

This followed a significant Supreme Court order from 15 October—outside this week’s reporting period—which recognised children’s access to the internet as a fundamental right and called for stronger systems to identify and remove child sexual exploitation material. The Court also warned that blanket restrictions could create privacy and surveillance risks.

The policy debate is therefore not simply about allowing or banning young people from social media. It is also about whether platforms can protect users without collecting excessive personal data, whether harmful content can be addressed quickly, and whether users have meaningful ways to challenge moderation decisions.

In Arunachal Pradesh, opposition to the proposed 11,200-megawatt Siang Upper Multipurpose Project intensified during the week.

The project is planned on the Siang River and is envisaged as a large multipurpose storage project. The government has described it as important for water and energy security, flood moderation and regional development. Its strategic context also includes concerns about China’s upstream hydropower plans on the Yarlung Tsangpo, which flows into India as the Siang and then the Brahmaputra.

On 2 November, a 36-hour shutdown called by the Siang Indigenous Farmers’ Forum and the SUMP Affected Area Youth Association disrupted normal life across parts of Siang, Upper Siang and East Siang districts.

The youth organisation demanded the release of people arrested after earlier anti-project protests and opposed the deployment of central security forces in affected areas. Mobile internet services were suspended in Upper Siang during the shutdown, according to regional reporting.

The agitation continued in the capital region. On 4 November, a 12-hour shutdown affected shops and transport in Itanagar. The state government gave an in-principle assurance that detainees would be released, prompting plans for further talks. On 7 November, the government released four activists who had been detained under the Arunachal Pradesh Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Chief Minister Pema Khandu said the government was not yet deciding whether to construct the dam. It was seeking to complete a Preliminary Feasibility Report, after which technical studies and statutory consultation processes would be required.

The government says the project could help manage water flows, improve energy security and address potential downstream risks. The Chief Minister has repeatedly said the project should not proceed without public consultation.

Sections of the indigenous Adi community and project-affected residents fear that the project could submerge villages, displace families, affect ancestral land and agricultural livelihoods, and alter the river’s ecological and cultural significance.

Some local reporting has put the number of potentially affected villages at 27. That figure should be treated as a reported estimate, not as a completed and independently verified impact assessment. A final Social Impact Assessment and Environmental Impact Assessment have not yet established the project’s full consequences.

The dispute is not simply about whether hydropower is useful. It is about what counts as meaningful consent when a project may affect the homes, land and identity of communities who live along the river.

If the feasibility process itself is contested, how can residents trust the information used to decide whether the project is viable? And what would consultation mean if communities can raise concerns but cannot meaningfully influence the outcome?

On 7 November, Kannada-language newspaper Kannada Prabha reported that the All India Democratic Students’ Organisation (AIDSO) had organised a protest in Ballari against Karnataka’s KPS Magnet School policy.

AIDSO alleged that the policy could lead to the closure of around 45,000 government schools and weaken public education. Protesters also raised concerns about conditions linked to Asian Development Bank funding and the role of corporate participation in school management. These are the organisation’s claims and projections, not a verified count of schools already closed.

The Karnataka government’s documented plan includes upgrading selected government schools into Karnataka Public Schools with improved infrastructure and a broader range of facilities.

A previous cabinet-approved plan described 800 schools for upgradation through different funding sources. The associated scheme also provides for merging smaller schools within a specified distance of designated KPS schools.

The government’s stated objective is to create stronger schools with better facilities, laboratories, libraries, computer education and teaching resources.

A school that is physically closer to a child’s home is not merely a building. It can determine whether a child can attend regularly, whether parents can manage transport costs, and whether girls or children from marginalised communities can continue studying safely.

If a smaller school is merged into a larger institution, the quality of the destination school matters—but so do the distance, transport arrangements, language of instruction and the needs of children who cannot easily travel.

The 45,000 figure deserves scrutiny. It should not be repeated as an established government closure target without documentary proof. But the existence of school-merger provisions makes the underlying concern about access legitimate enough to investigate.

Two developments this week exposed different parts of India’s changing employment landscape.

On 4 November, The Economic Times reported that the Centre was considering a transaction-based levy of up to 2% on aggregators to fund social security for more than 12 million gig and platform workers.

The proposed scheme could provide life and disability insurance, accident cover, health benefits and maternity support. It may be introduced in 2027, but the final structure has not yet been decided.

The proposal is expected to be funded by aggregators rather than workers or the Union government. One issue under consideration is whether contributions should be calculated on transactions rather than overall turnover, partly because different platform business models account for revenue differently.

There is also an eligibility question. Under the relevant rules, workers generally need 90 days of engagement with one aggregator, or 120 days across multiple aggregators in a financial year, to qualify under the scheme.

That threshold could be difficult for people who work intermittently, seasonally or across several apps without meeting the required number of days on paper.

Earlier this year, the Indian Federation of App-based Transport Workers had warned that delays in aggregator data-sharing were holding up welfare protections. This matters because a benefit cannot reach workers if their work records are incomplete or inaccurate.

The next test is not just the percentage charged to platforms. It is whether workers can register, qualify, claim benefits and challenge incorrect records.

A major investigation published by The Guardian on 6 November examined working conditions in Panipat, Haryana, one of the world’s largest textile-recycling centres.

The city processes discarded clothing into fibres and yarn used in products sold across international markets. The investigation described dangerous machinery, inadequate safety mechanisms and a largely informal workforce.

Its reporting included the case of a 19-year-old migrant worker from West Bengal who had travelled to Panipat hoping to earn money for his family. The investigation also reviewed reports from 11 private hospitals and two government hospitals over one week in August, identifying six cases of serious limb injuries among textile workers.

An activist who has tracked workplace injuries in the city estimated that at least one worker loses a limb each day. That is his estimate, not an official government statistic. A local police officer separately told the newspaper that fewer than 1% of workplace injury cases reached his station and were formally registered. The investigation also reported that more than 90% of factory-floor workers in the sector were informally employed.

The distinction matters: the hospital review provides a limited sample; the activist’s figure is an estimate; and the police officer’s statement reflects his own station’s experience. Together, however, they raise questions about how much workplace harm remains outside formal reporting.

A country can create jobs and build a global recycling industry while still leaving young and migrant workers exposed to unsafe conditions and uncertain compensation.

What should a job guarantee besides wages? And who is responsible when the supply chain benefits from work that is difficult to see and even harder to regulate?

Delhi’s worsening air quality forced another change to everyday life during the week.

On 6 November, the Commission for Air Quality Management invoked Stage III of the Graded Response Action Plan across Delhi-NCR. The CAQM’s portal showed Delhi’s AQI at 368 at 9pm on 7 November, in the “very poor” category. The Commission’s Stage III measures had been active since 6 November.

Schools in Delhi were directed to conduct classes up to Class 5 in hybrid mode, allowing students to attend either online or in person where facilities were available. The measures followed a deterioration in air quality and warnings that conditions could worsen.

Reuters reported that pre-winter conditions were trapping emissions from vehicles, construction and crop-residue burning across northern India. Falling temperatures and weak winds were making it harder for pollutants to disperse. Fireworks around Diwali were expected to add to the pollution burden.

On 2 November, the Supreme Court temporarily permitted certified green firecrackers in Delhi-NCR during specified hours on 7 and 8 November, while restricting their use near hospitals and other designated sensitive areas. The complete ban was scheduled to return from 9 November.

The decision reflects a familiar conflict: how to accommodate a major festival while limiting harm to public health.

But the effects of poor air quality are not distributed equally. Students may be able to switch to online classes, but workers who spend the day outdoors cannot simply log in from home. Nor does every household have the same access to devices, stable internet or a safe indoor environment.

A hybrid-school order may reduce exposure for some children. It does not answer the larger question of why the air repeatedly reaches levels that interrupt ordinary life.

Two developments on 4 November showed how rapidly AI is entering India’s financial infrastructure.

The NPCI established a wholly owned technology subsidiary, NPCI Tech Solutions Limited, to work on artificial intelligence, blockchain and digital financial infrastructure. The initiative is intended to expand the organisation’s technology capabilities beyond its core payments responsibilities.

On the same day, India’s Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre warned financial institutions about cyberattacks using AI agents. The advisory said attackers were exploiting unpatched software and misconfigured systems, then targeting automated fund-disbursement systems and payment APIs.

Reuters also reported that 3,900 customer records had been affected by a data leak at the State Bank of India, while the Reserve Bank of India had raised concerns about cyberattacks on financial infrastructure.

These developments do not mean that every UPI transaction or banking app is unsafe. They do show that as financial services become more automated, the consequences of weak cybersecurity can spread quickly.

For young people, digital infrastructure is not an abstract policy subject. It is how they pay, study, apply for jobs, receive money and communicate.

If institutions are investing in AI-driven financial systems, what level of transparency should users expect when those systems fail? And who bears the cost when a security failure affects ordinary account holders?

IssueWhat is establishedWhat remains unresolved
UGC equity regulationsThe 2026 rules remain stayed; the Centre told the Supreme Court it was considering a review committee.What the revised rules will contain, how complaints will be handled and how every affected group will be protected.
Campus protestsCourts and universities have acted in disputes involving examination eligibility, protest sites and academic shutdowns.Whether disciplinary measures are proportionate, and how institutions can protect both academic continuity and student expression.
Fake takedown noticesX told the Delhi High Court that purported police notices targeting two digital-rights groups were fake.Who submitted them and how platforms should verify government requests before acting.
LPU violencePolice reported no evidence supporting the alleged assault and filed a cancellation report; separate violence-related FIRs remain.Whether the court accepts the cancellation report and who is responsible for the unrest and property damage.
Siang projectThe project remains at the feasibility stage; protests, shutdowns and arrests occurred during the week.Its final environmental and social impact, the extent of community consent and whether consultation can change the project’s direction.
Karnataka schoolsThe KPS Magnet scheme includes school upgrades and provisions for merging smaller schools.The actual number of schools and children affected, and whether transport and access commitments work in practice.
Gig workersA transaction-based levy is under consideration for a future social-security scheme.The final contribution formula, eligibility, implementation date and whether workers can access benefits reliably.
PollutionDelhi-NCR entered Stage III GRAP measures and introduced hybrid schooling for primary classes.Whether enforcement and long-term emissions reductions will prevent repeated school and work disruptions.

A review committee can rewrite regulations, but who will measure whether discrimination on campuses actually declines? A university can defend academic discipline, but what independent route remains available when students believe the administration itself is failing them?

A government can promise consultation on a major project, but how much influence will affected communities have once the technical process is complete? A platform can announce a welfare fund, but will a worker with irregular hours be able to qualify for it? A city can shift classes online, but what protection exists for those whose jobs cannot move indoors?

And as more of public life moves through digital systems, who checks the institutions that claim authority over our speech, our information and our data?

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